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The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions Towards North Korea:  
Domestic Coalitions and International Systemic Pressures 
 
Christopher W. Hughes, University of Warwick 
 
Introduction 
Japan has often been dismissed as a bit part actor in Korean Peninsula security affairs. 
Japan, in much of the mainstream academic literature and policy discourse on the 
North Korean security issue, if ascribed any role at all, is seen as a secondary and 
submissive diplomatic actor: functioning chiefly to support US and South Korean 
initiatives towards the North through the provision of potential economic incentives; 
and generally bending to US strategy, whether in the bilateral context of the US-Japan 
alliance, or the multilateral contexts of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight 
Group (TCOG) and ongoing Six Party Talks (SPT).1 Japan’s role in the North Korean 
security issue would thus appear in line with many other traditional interpretations of 
its international relations as submissive to US strategy and international systemic 
pressures. 
 
More recently, though, academic commentators and policy practitioners have shown a 
new awareness that Japan’s own bilateral agenda and domestic political conditions are 
rising in importance relative to international factors in determining its overall policy 
orientation towards the North. Bilateral tensions over the abductions of Japanese 
citizens (rachi jiken), and subsequent moves in Japan to enact legal conditions for the 
unilateral imposition of sanctions on the North—and thereby to shift its declared 
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policy of a balance of “dialogue and pressure” (taiwa to atsuryoku) towards pressure 
and containment—have particularly highlighted the influence of domestic political 
considerations. In turn, Japan’s preoccupation with domestic political pressures has 
clearly impacted upon its flexibility and compliance as a partner in international 
strategies to deal with the North. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) 
persistent raising of the abductions issue at all rounds of the SPT has produced some 
disquiet amongst their US, South Korean and Chinese counterparts that North Korea 
may use this as an additional pretext to evade negotiations, and, hence, that an 
essentially Japanese domestic and bilateral issue may trump the progress of 
multilateral efforts on the North’s nuclear programme.2 
 
Indeed, the argument of this article is that the abductions issue, and the intimation that 
it provides of the importance of domestic politics, is really only the tip of the iceberg 
of deeper lying domestic and bilateral concerns that are hampering progress in Japan-
North Korea relations. It is crucial not be blinded to the domestic sources of Japan’s 
foreign policy in order to understand the nature of its relationship with the North, and 
concomitantly with the US and South Korea. This article argues that, whilst 
international systemic pressures have often been and still remain decisive in many 
instances for influencing the direction of Japan’s North Korea policy, it is equally 
important to recognise that an over-concentration on international factors can obscure 
crucial domestic explanations that account for Japan’s approach to the North, and can 
so lead to mistaken academic and policy analysis. Hence, this article seeks to add to 
those existing approaches that lift the lid on the proverbial ‘black box’ of the Japanese 
policymaking system and to demonstrate the increasingly important role of domestic 
political and bilateral concerns, alongside international concerns, in driving its North 
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Korea policy. In fact, this article argues not only for the need to factor in domestic 
politics as of mounting importance in shaping Japan’s North Korea policy, but also 
for the need to recognise that in certain instances domestic pressures are threatening 
to outstrip international pressures as the prime determinant. 
 
These arguments also have important implications for understanding Japan’s general 
diplomatic standing in Korean Peninsula security affairs. For if the Japanese foreign 
policymaking process, as a result of domestic political pressures, demonstrates signs 
of shifting to a policy of containment of the North through the imposition of unilateral 
sanctions, or experiences increasing obstacles to providing active support for US 
strategy, then this could derail US-Japan bilateral and US-Japan-South Korea trilateral 
cooperation efforts, as well as hinder greatly the process of the SPT, and any other 
internationally co-ordinated attempts in the future to resolve the nuclear issue. In this 
way, Japan’s domestic political pressures, and how they impact on the level of 
Japanese cooperation with the US, South Korea and other states, magnify the 
influence of Japan as an actor in Korean Peninsula security affairs; even if that 
influence may ultimately obstruct progress on a resolution to the nuclear issue. 
 
Theories and methodology 
This article does not reject standard ‘realist’ varieties of international systemic or 
structure-based explanations for Japan’s foreign policy and international relations that 
tend to see it as highly sensitive and often submissive to external power relationships 
with other states and particularly its US ally.3 Instead, it proposes that these 
international systemic explanations need to be employed in conjunction with, and 
weighed against, pressures emanating from the domestic policymaking process. This 
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is in line with other more recent theoretical and empirical case studies that emphasise 
the importance historically of pluralistic domestic policy interests, such as party 
politics, domestic administrative institutions, and public opinion, in countering or 
even overcoming international systemic pressures on Japan’s security and foreign 
policy orientation.4 However, this article also aims to build upon and provide a 
distinct contribution to this literature by going beyond highlighting the importance of 
domestic variables per se, and now indicating a set of dynamic processes and 
circumstances which account for why and when domestic political pressures can 
accumulate to the point that they may rival international systemic pressures in 
determining foreign policy. 
 
The specific case study that this article utilises to examine the varying strengths of 
international pressures and pluralistic domestic agency in determining Japan’s North 
Korea policy is that of the deliberations concerning the imposition of sanctions. The 
case of sanctions is intrinsically important in itself, given that Japan’s decision about 
their imposition may hold the key to determining the degree of its cooperation with 
US and other concerned states’ strategies towards resolving the nuclear issue. This 
article makes no attempt to examine the actual effectiveness of sanctions on North 
Korea. This is beyond the scope of this article, and the focus is solely on explaining 
the political process behind any decision to impose sanctions.5 
 
Sanctions theory is especially useful because it indicates that, whilst in many cases 
‘realist’ explanations of international systemic coercion and offers of side payments 
may account for states’ decisions to cooperate or not over the imposition of sanctions, 
in other cases domestic political and economic interests may prove just as dominant in 
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sanctions behaviour.6 This strain of sanctions theory, much drawn from the public 
choice literature, but also much qualitative in nature, provides a number of domestic 
political economy-focussed explanations for the imposition of sanctions. It indicates a 
pluralistic range of domestic policy actors—including bureaucratic and political elites, 
business interests, public opinion and special interest groups—that are crucial in 
lobbying for or against state action in the imposition of sanctions.7 It further indicates 
that these domestic actors will be in a position to tip central government policy 
towards sanctions when they are able to form a sufficiently strong coalition amongst 
themselves. These ‘log-rolling’ or ‘threshold’ coalitions result from the actions of 
leading key members of the coalition that are able to motivate others for collective 
action.8 
 
Motivations for the imposition of sanctions are multifarious and not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. They include ‘instrumental sanctions’ that are attempts by the 
sender state to effect genuine policy change in the target; ‘expressive sanctions’ that 
represent a desire for moral and psychological assurance and to ‘do something’, short 
of more costly military measures, in protest at the actions of the target state; and 
sanctions that may function more for the pecuniary and political interests of domestic 
actors because they provide protection for domestic industries or political credit for 
being seen to take action against an abhorrent target state.9 Moreover, the fact that the 
formation of domestic coalitions in favour of sanctions is often dependent on the 
ability to motivate particular interest groups means that smaller coalition actors are 
particularly effective in exploiting the opportunities to leverage the collective interests 
of the coalition against the central government. Hence, this means that in practice 
coalition groups that reflect a narrow range of motivations, even if they portray or 
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perceive themselves as in the interest of the majority, can override the influence of 
larger and more powerful domestic actors.10 Also this means that if genuinely 
powerful domestic groups choose not to participate in the domestic contestation over 
sanctions, then, by default, less powerful interest groups may actually dominate the 
policy outcome due to their coalition-building abilities. Finally, this ability of 
coalitions of domestic political actors, often orchestrated by minority interests, to 
capture state policy can also lead to instances whereby states pursue the imposition of 
sanctions in contravention, or irrespective, of international pressures. 
 
It is the contention of this article that Japan’s policy towards North Korea has shown 
increasing signs in recent years of being driven by domestic over international 
pressures; and based on sanctions theory it is this article’s further contention that this 
move towards sanctions is the result of the formation of a ‘threshold’ domestic 
coalition that seeks to contain rather than engage the North. Arguably, this marks a 
potentially decisive turn in Japan’s policy orientation. This is because in previous 
years either the international pressures were great enough to prevail over relatively 
weak domestic coalitions, or because relatively strong domestic coalitions were 
actually in favour or engaging North Korea, thus making for policy outcomes in line 
with international pressures and usually predisposed to engagement rather than 
containment. 
 
In order to substantiate these arguments this article is divided into two empirical 
sections. The first section provides an overview and analysis of Japan’s relations with 
North Korea from the early 1990s to the present day, punctuated by special 
examination of three instances in 1993-1994, 1998-1999, and 2003-2006, of Japan’s 
 7
consideration or actual imposition of a range of sanctions on North Korea. This 
overview demonstrates the fluctuating importance over time of international pressures 
in influencing Japan’s policies of engagement and containment towards the North, but 
also how Japanese domestic political and bilateral concerns have intervened, with 
varying degrees of influence, to further shape policy outcomes. The second section 
then moves to explain this varying influence of domestic political and bilateral 
concerns vis-à-vis international pressures on Japan’s sanctions policy. It does so by 
analysing in detail the nature of the extant domestic political coalitions, and the policy 
interests of their various constituent political and economic actors. It demonstrates 
that by aggregating these interests, then the relative strength and cohesion of domestic 
political coalitions overtime can be judged, and hence so can their relative strength 
vis-à-vis international systemic pressures. It argues that, based on current evidence, a 
strong domestic coalition has indeed coalesced in Japan in favour of sanctions, more 
prepared than at any time over the previous decade and a half to challenge, and even 
overturn, international systemic pressures. In turn, this detection of an emergent 
threshold coalition provides important insights into understanding the dynamic 
process of how and when domestic variables rise to reinforce or challenge 
international systemic factors in Japan’s North Korea policy and its foreign policy 
more widely. 
 
Japan’s engagement and containment of North Korea: international and 
domestic pressures 
In terms of international systemic pressures, Japan’s government has sought to 
emphasise that it retains control over bilateral relations with North Korea, but it has 
also stressed that its policy largely conforms with the mix of containment and 
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engagement policies of the US and South Korea. In terms of domestic politics and 
bilateral issues, as will be seen in the next section, a number of actors—including 
MOFA, elements of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the 
opposition parties, as well as business interests, the North Korean community in 
Japan, and single-issue pressure groups—have been involved in making diplomatic 
relations with North Korea. 
 
Japan’s optimum long-term strategy, and the one accepted by the most influential 
policymakers for dealing with North Korea has been one of engagement. However, as 
will be seen from the following overview of Japan-North Korea relations over the last 
decade, Japan has not always found it possible to maintain a constant policy line 
towards the North 
  
Phase 1: Normalisation talks and the first nuclear crisis, 1990-1995 
Japan’s first opportunity for full engagement with North Korea arrived with the end of 
the Cold War, which lessened the international pressures on Japan to cooperate in the 
containment of the North. This produced the opportunity for Kanemaru Shin’s visit to 
North Korea and issuance of the Three-Party Joint Declaration in September 1990, 
and then the opening for government-to-government normalisation negotiations from 
January 1991 to November 1992. The progress (or lack of it) of these negotiations has 
been detailed elsewhere. However, it is important to note here that their failure was 
principally the result of Japanese domestic political and bilateral issues with the 
North, including the colonial and postwar apology and compensation issues, the 
Nihonjinzuma, and the first raising of the abductions issue. 
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In addition to these bilateral and domestic issues, though, a further decisive brake was 
placed on Japan’s normalisation and engagement efforts by the rise of new 
international systemic pressures. Firstly, Japan was obliged to reassure an anxious 
South Korean government that it would only pursue negotiations in parallel with 
progress in North-South dialogue. This policy of linkage (renkei) was not formally 
binding, but in reality was the start of MOFA tying Japan’s diplomacy more closely 
with that of South Korea, and of the formation of one side of the emergent trilateral 
framework of US-Japan-South Korea diplomatic cooperation. The practical outcome 
of Japan’s renkei policy was to impose a near international ‘double-lock’ on its 
diplomacy with the North: obliging it to consider the restart of normalisation talks 
with North Korea in step with improvements in North-South relations, which in 
themselves were largely contingent on improvements in US-North Korea relations. 
 
Secondly, Japan’s inability to engage North Korea was compounded in this period by 
the international pressures of US-North Korea confrontation during the first nuclear 
crisis of 1993-1994. Japan was at this point forced to consider a switch to containment 
through the participation in US-led sanctions against the North, including the 
cessation of remittances by the North Korean community in Japan, and the 
participation of the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) in a naval blockade. Japanese 
policy was eventually averted from sanctions by the combined intervention of 
domestic politics and the receding of international pressures. LDP and then coalition 
Japanese governments between 1993 and 1994 indicated to the US that Japan would 
be hard-pressed politically and militarily to support the imposition of sanctions. Japan 
was then saved from a confrontation with the US over its credibility as an alliance 
partner by the US’s own shift towards engagement with North Korea and the Agreed 
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Framework of October 1994. Hence, in this first phase of Japan-North Korea 
relations, concluding with the consideration but then rejection of sanctions, it can be 
seen that Japan avoided moves towards containment because of domestic political 
conditions predisposed more towards tentative engagement, and because of an 
international system that first threatened to challenge but then reinforced this position. 
 
Phase 2: KEDO and the ‘Taepdong-shock’, 1995-2000 
Japan’s second phase of dealing with North Korea was marked by the rise of an 
international environment generally conducive to engagement with North Korea. The 
US moved towards careful engagement with North Korea through the Agreed 
Framework, the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organisation (KEDO) in March 1995, and then, following the October 1998 Perry 
Report, through the visit of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang in 
November 2000. Similarly, South Korea moved to engage North Korea through 
President Kim Dae-Jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy’. 
 
Despite the relatively propitious international situation that lifted the double-lock on 
its diplomacy, however, in this period Japan encountered increasing domestic and 
bilateral obstacles to engaging North Korea. Japan attempted to restart normalisation 
talks through former Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio’s LDP-SDPJ-Sakigake 
delegation to the North in March 1995, the government’s provision bilaterally of 
500,000 tons of rice aid in June and October, and Mori Yoshirō’s LDP-SDPJ-
Sakigake mission to the North in November 1997. But increasing domestic pressure 
over the Nihonjinzuma and abductions issue effectively blocked the restart of 
normalisation negotiations between 1995 and 1997-1998. North Korea’s test launch 
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of a Taepdong-1 ballistic missile over Japan on 31 August 1998 then pushed Japan 
towards the containment of the North through the imposition of limited sanctions. 
Japan’s government announced the suspension of its signing of the KEDO funding 
agreements, to which it was expected to contribute approximately US$1 billion; the 
stoppage of food aid and normalisation talks, and thus the North’s access to a believed 
figure of up to US$10 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) as part of 
Japan’s package for settling the colonial past; and the cancellation of charter flights 
between Japan and North Korea, many of which were used to carry North Korean 
agricultural commodities to Japan such as high-priced matsutake mushrooms.11 
Japanese politicians also mooted proposals to cut remittances to North Korea as in the 
1994 nuclear crisis. 
 
Japan’s domestic political pressures in this period were insufficient, though, to 
overcome the strength of international pressures. Japan was persuaded by US and 
South Korean policymakers to sign the KEDO agreements in October 1999, to lift its 
other sanctions by December 1999, and to restart bilateral normalisation negotiations 
between April 2000 and October 2001. Japan prepared the grounds for these talks by 
the dispatch of former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s mission to the North in 
November 1999, and by the provision of 100,000 and 500,000 tons of rice aid via the 
World Food Programme (WFP) in March and October 2000. Japan thus moved back 
into step with the US and South Korea, although its reaction in the post-‘Taepodong-
shock’ period was a portent of the increasing strength of domestic forces oriented 
towards containment in shaping its North Korea policy. 
 
Phase 3: Koizumi’s summitry and sanctions, 2001-2006 
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In this third phase Japan has been confronted by the closing in once again of 
international pressures, resulting from the US’s enhanced hard-line approach towards 
North Korea over its nuclear programme, especially in the early stages of the first 
Bush administration, and the North’s response of ratcheting up military tensions. In 
the situation of the collapse of the Agreed Framework, and the restart of the North 
nuclear programme, Japan has been faced with increased pressure to adhere to the US 
policy line, mindful as it is of its need to rely in large part on the US for its security. 
At the same time, the domestic pressures on Japan’s policy towards North Korea to 
lean towards containment have also grown, with MOFA stressing by 2002 that the 
settlement of the abductions had now become the official precondition for the restart 
of normalisation negotiations. 
 
The Japanese government’s sandwiching between these international and domestic 
pressures has created for Japan an uncomfortable strategic situation. On the one hand, 
whilst highly concerned about the North Korea’s nuclear programme and the need to 
maintain confidence in the US-Japan alliance to deter the North, Japan has been 
concerned that the US hard-line approach might lead to renewed military 
confrontation. On the other, Japanese policymakers have been aware that the growing 
domestic pressure in favour of the containment of the North has undercut its 
diplomatic flexibility to support the US in the event of its shifting back towards 
engagement. 
 
Japan subsequently sought to break this deadlock with Prime Minister’s Koizumi’s 
summitry with North Korea in 2002 and 2004.12 Koizumi’s September 2002 summit 
with Kim Jong-Il produced the ‘Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration’, significant 
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progress on the abductions issue, and the resumption of normalisation talks in October 
2002. However, the talks subsequently stalled over Japan’s insistence that the 
surviving abductees should be permitted to remain permanently in Japan and the 
Jenkins case. Koizumi then pushed bilateral ties further forward with his second visit 
to Pyongyang in May 2004, and a pledge of 250,000 tons of food aid to the North, 
leading to continuing discussions into the fate of the non-surviving abductees, and an 
eventual resolution of the Jenkins case in late 2004. Japan-North Korea bilateral talks 
then foundered in December 2004 over the Yokota Megumi controversy. 
 
Japan’s bold diplomacy under Koizumi was motivated by several calculations, Firstly, 
although informed by concern over the North’s nuclear programme and the need to 
line up with the US in the final instance to take action against the North, Japan’s 
policymakers were also convinced of the need to demonstrate to the US the need to 
attempt engagement in order to avoid conflict with the North. Secondly, Japanese 
policymakers were conscious that the abductions issue had to be addressed head on as 
the key domestic factor militating against Japanese diplomatic flexibility.13 Japanese 
diplomacy can in many ways be seen to have achieved greater autonomy with 
Koizumi’s visits to North Korea. Koizumi directly and successfully challenged the 
tightening international pressures by visiting North Korea in spite of US disquiet, and 
thus carved out more diplomatic freedom for Japan. Koizumi’s diplomacy also 
challenged bilateral and domestic constraints by ensuring that North Korea acceded to 
Japan’s negotiating demands for normalisation in the Joint Declaration, and by 
making important inroads into the abductions issue. 
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However, since 2004 Japan has appeared largely unable to exploit these opportunities 
for enhanced engagement with North Korea. Japan has had greater opportunities to 
engage North Korea with the loosening of international pressures following the 
Bush’s administration’s determination of its need for a diplomatic resolution to the 
nuclear crisis and the initiation of the SPT in Beijing since August 2003. Japan’s 
freedom of action internationally has been further enhanced with South Korea’s 
determination to push ahead with its own engagement of the North. Moreover, even 
as the Bush administration has begun since late 2005 and the stagnation of the SPT 
process to enhance its pressure on North Korea through the tightening of financial 
sanctions, it has still searched for means to engage the North diplomatically and to 
restart the SPT, thus looking to achieve a balance of containment and engagement. 
 
Nonetheless, the domestic political pressures on the Japanese government to shift its 
own policy towards containment have markedly grown since late 2004, with Japan’s 
consideration of a range of sanctions, illustrated in the table below. In March 2006, 
the LDP further ramped up the pressure by submitting a bill that would force the 
government to impose sanctions if North Korea failed to make progress on resolving 
the abductions issue.14 The sanctions proposed are the most extensive, and potentially 
deep-biting of any of the three phases of Japan-North Korea relations. Moreover, 
Japan’s move towards these sanctions has been largely unilateral, and often in 
contravention of US requests to refrain. The evidence then is of a shift in this third 
phase towards containment in Japan, even if at increasing loggerheads to international 
pressures. 
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Table: Japan’s economic sanctions on North Korea as of 2005 
 
 
Specific measures Background, significance and objective  Legal basis Procedures 
for 
enactment 
State of progress 
Tightening of procedures for the 
reporting of remittances 
Ministry of 
Finance 
ordinance 
Stoppage of remittances 
Prohibition of import of specific 
items 
Total cessation of trade with 
North Korea  
-enables Japan to impose sanctions unilaterally, 
whereas it previously required cooperation of UN or 
one or more states  
Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade 
Law (FEFTL) 
Revised 9 February 2004 Direct 
economic 
sanctions 
Prohibition on entry into 
Japanese ports of North Korean 
shipping 
-includes all North Korean shipping, but chief target 
is Manyongbong-92 passenger ship that serves as 
main transport link for physical carrying of 
remittances via Niigata 
Law to Prevent 
Designated Ships 
From Visiting 
Japanese Ports 
Cabinet 
decision, 
followed by 
National 
Diet 
approval Enacted 14 June 2004 
Stoppage of food aid to North 
Korea  
 None required Imposed December 2004 
Consistent labelling of asari 
(short-neck clams) as products 
of North Korean origin  
-asari constitute 22% of Japanese imports from 
North Korea 
-enables Japanese consumers to voluntarily boycott 
North Korean products 
Japan Agricultural 
Standards (JAS) Law 
Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries 
regulation 
Enacted June 2004 
Obligatory insurance for North 
Korean ships over 100 tons in 
displacement 
-only 2.8% of North Korean ships have the necessary 
insurance 
-¥100 million premium thought prohibitive for the 
North 
Law on Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage 
 Revised 1 March 2005 
Support for North Korean 
asylum seekers 
-instructs central and local government to provide 
asylum seekers with passage to third countries and 
long term residence in Japan 
-encourages political defections and the 
destabilisation of North Korean regime 
Bill for law for relief 
of human rights 
infringements 
relating to North 
Korea  
 Submitted for deliberation to 
the National Diet February 
2005; resubmitted February 
2006 
Measures 
equivalent 
to 
economic 
sanctions, 
or ‘virtual’ 
sanctions 
 
Tightening of supervision of 
Chōsensōren-affilitated credit 
unions, or Chōgin 
-Chōgin collapsed in 1990s suspected as the result of 
illegal channelling of funds to North Korea 
-Japanese politicians in 2003 attempted to obstruct 
use of ¥1.4 trillion of public bail-out funds 
- government has provided funds, but on condition 
of appointment of Japanese nationals as Chōgin 
presidents 
Cooperative 
Associations Services 
Law 
Financial 
Services 
Authority 
regulation 
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Removal of local government  
tax-exemptions for Chōsensōren 
-Chōsensōren tax exempt status in place since 1972 
when Governor of Tokyo declared the organisation a 
de facto diplomatic representative of the North 
  Governor of Tokyo rescinds 
tax status July 2003; NARKN 
lawsuit forces Kumamoto 
City to rescind tax status 
February 2006 
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Japan’s sanctions policy and domestic coalitions 
In the decade since the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the underlying trend in 
Japan’s North Korea policy has been a strengthening shift from a position of default 
engagement to one of default containment, as witnessed in its consideration of 
unilateral sanctions. Japan’s government has been increasingly pushed towards a 
position of containment, which it is difficult to back out of, or for pressure from the 
international system to overcome. Domestic political conditions have not just been an 
important and constant variable in shaping Japan’s policy shift over the last decade, 
but are now also challenging international factors in setting the overall orientation of 
policy. In turn, this focus on the increasingly vital role of domestic politics vis-à-vis 
the international system reinforces the argument at the outset of this article that it is 
only possible to explain Japan’s move towards sanctions and its overall North Korea 
policy by examining the nature of coalitions within its domestic political economy. 
 
MOFA 
The starting point for this examination is MOFA, charged as it is with the central role 
in devising and implementing Japan’s North Korea policy through balancing domestic 
political pressures and the international systemic pressures of managing relations with 
the US, South Korea and other regional powers. MOFA has persisted in seeking 
engagement towards North Korea since the 1990s, recognising the potential benefits 
for Japanese and regional security, and wishing to obviate a conflict with the North. 
 
However, MOFA’s ability to pursue a consistent policy of engagement has been 
hampered by the activities of Japanese politicians engaged in ‘individual’ (kojin 
gaikō) and ‘dual diplomacy’ (nijū gaikō), as in the case of Kanemaru in 1990. MOFA 
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has gradually clawed back control of the negotiating agenda by patiently building up 
its own direct links with the North Korean elites, and thereby making redundant the 
negotiating ‘pipes’, or links, that the politicians have maintained with North Korea. 
Tanaka Hitoshi as Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau 
(AOAB) from September 2001 until December 2002, and then later as the Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs until July 2005, was particularly instrumental in boosting 
the role of MOFA in controlling the negotiating agenda with North Korea by enlisting 
the support of the Prime Minister’s Office, or Kantei, and Koizumi himself, in 
conducting secret diplomacy with the North leading up to the 2002 summit. 
 
However, MOFA’s ability and inclination to engage North Korea since the late 1990s 
has subsequently been hampered by the ministry’s domestic political weaknesses. 
MOFA’s policy-making influence has been debilitated by its engulfment in financial 
scandals since 2001; the damaging appointment of Tanaka Makiko from April 2001 to 
January 2002 that left the ministry adrift from political influence; and the resultant 
loss of senior personnel.15 In turn, MOFA officials involved with North Korea 
diplomacy—including Makita Kunihiko, the former Director General of the AOAB 
from 1998 until September 2001, and Tanaka Hitoshi—have been the subject of 
acerbic media and political attacks.  
 
Added to this climate of personal professional and physical risk, MOFA has been 
hindered by its internal divisions. Tanaka’s conduct of ‘secret diplomacy’ (himitsu 
gaikō) with North Korea in the run-up to the 2002 summit, with limited consultation 
with the other MOFA bureaus, drew considerable internal criticism from the North 
American Affairs Bureau (NAAB), fearful of the impact on ties with the US. 
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Moreover, since the slowing of the momentum for improvements in Japan-North 
Korea ties after the initial successes of the 2002 summit, the internal balance of 
influence within the ministry has increasingly shifted towards personnel in favour of 
containment. Takeuchi Yukio, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Japan’s top 
diplomat from February 2002 until December 2005, although experienced in North 
Korea affairs since his spell as Deputy Director of AOAB at the time of the 1995 
Watanabe mission, was aligned more closely with NAAB and a known opponent of 
Tanaka’s style of diplomacy.16 Tanaka was largely protected in his position by his 
close ties to Koizumi. However, Koizumi’s relatively declining interest in North 
Korea affairs after the 2004 summit and preoccupation with domestic reforms 
removed Tanaka’s influence, and he accepted early retirement in 2005. Meanwhile, 
Takeuchi himself has been replaced by Yachi Shōtarō, known to be close to both 
Koizumi and former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shintarō, and generally 
hard-line on engagement and sanctions towards North Korea.17 In addition to these 
bureaucratic personnel changes, political changes in leadership have compounded 
MOFA’s negative stance towards engagement: Machimura Nobutaka, the Foreign 
Minister from November 2004 to October 2005 freely indicated that the imposition of 
sanctions was one means to pressure the North over the abductions issue; and his 
successor Asō Tarō is a known hard-liner on North Korea.18 
 
Prime Minister’s Office 
The Prime Minister’s and the Kantei’s increasingly important role in proactive 
Japanese diplomacy has been noted in response to the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan 
and Iraq since 11 September 2001, but the core executive’s role has been equally 
crucial in coordinating North Korea policy.19 Koizumi essentially ran much of Japan’s 
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North Korean diplomacy from the Kantei and bypassed normal MOFA channels in 
the run-up to the 2002 and 2004 summits, entrusting the preparations to Tanaka 
Hitoshi and Fukuda Yasuo, the then Chief Cabinet Secretary.20 From late 2004, 
Koizumi has relied less on Tanaka Hitoshi, and more on his old LDP political ally, 
Yamasaki Taku, acting in a special advisory role until his re-election to the Diet in 
April 2005. 
 
Koizumi’s willingness to risk his political credibility on North Korea, and his ability 
to force through policy by relying on a small group of advisors, has been crucial not 
only for the breakthroughs made on the abductions issue in 2002 and 2004, but also 
for restraining anti-North Korean domestic political pressure thereafter. Koizumi 
appears to have often removed from influence those officials who might wish to take 
a hard-line stance: engineering, for instance, the resignation in September 2004 of 
Nakayama Kyōko, a former Cabinet liaison officer between the government and 
abductee relatives, who had publicly criticised Yamasaki’s and LDP member 
Hirasawa Katsuei’s secret meeting with North Korean officials in April 2004.21 
Koizumi has also frequently attempted to restrain domestic pressure for the sanctions 
option. For instance, in the Diet in March 2004, Koizumi referred to sanctions as a 
‘glittering sword’ that once unsheathed may prove double-edged in effectiveness, 
because it may indicate the seriousness of Japan’s intent to North Korea, but also set 
Japan on a path to using this tool and conflict with the North.22 
 
Koizumi’s capability to restrain anti-North Korea domestic pressures, however, is 
doubtful over the longer term. Koizumi is genuinely convinced of the benefits for 
Japanese and regional security in seeking to engage North Korea, but has also found 
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significant, if declining, domestic political utility in his summit diplomacy in the 
North. Opinion polls taken immediately after Koizumi’s visit to the North in 2002 
demonstrated an eighty one per cent approval for his diplomatic actions, with a boost 
in support for the Cabinet from fifty one to sixty one per cent; and then Koizumi’s 
second visit in 2004 received a seventy per cent approval rating, but with no 
significant boost for the Cabinet’s approval rate.23 An Asahi Shimbum opinion poll in 
December 2004 also demonstrated that sixty three per cent of respondents were in 
favour of sanctions.24 
 
Hence, even though Koizumi has shown signs of returning to the North Korea 
normalisation issue at the end of his period of office—knowing that it will be his final 
opportunity to establish a historic foreign policy legacy—the diminishing domestic 
returns of North Korea diplomacy, has meant that he has devoted less consistent 
policy attention and political energy on active engagement. It appears that Koizumi 
has been increasingly content to allow Abe Shinzō, as the newly appointed Chief 
Cabinet Secretary in October 2005, to use the Prime Minister’s Office as a powerbase 
to pursue the abductions issue. Koizumi has continued to restrain Abe from initiating 
any definite move to sanctions, but has nevertheless allowed him to pursue a top-
down style of decision-making that has frequently sidelined MOFA’s negotiating 
channels and intimated Japan’s willingness to use sanctions as a means to force a 
resolution to the abductions issue.25 
 
LDP 
The LDP as the governing party, singly or in coalition from 1955 to 2005, and with 
the exception of August 1993 to June 1994, has played a crucial role in the history of 
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Japan-North Korea relations through the individual diplomacy of key party leaders 
and through domestic political support for government-level negotiations. Of all the 
Japanese domestic actors, however, the LDP has exhibited the most radical 
turnaround in its position on North Korea—moving from a position of default 
engagement for nearly the entire post-war period to one of default containment from 
the late 1990s onwards—with a profound impact on the overall make-up of domestic 
coalitions predisposed towards the containment of the North. 
 
From the early to the late 1990s, a number of key LDP politicians demonstrated 
interest in the normalisation of ties with the North in order to clear up the legacy of 
colonialism and contribute to regional stability, but also for domestic political gain. 
Kanemaru’s visit to North Korea in 1990 may have been motivated in large part by 
potential financial gains for his Takeshita Noboru faction. Kanemaru is rumoured to 
have received money directly from the Chōsensōren, the umbrella organisation of the 
North Korean community in Japan, and associated businesses such as the pachinko 
industry; from the North Korean government (notoriously including gold ingots found 
in his secretary’s safe during the Sagawa Kyūbin investigations of 1993); and from the 
construction industry eager to gain access to cheap supplies of salt-free alluvial 
building gravels (jari) in the North, a resource for high-quality concrete largely 
exhausted in Japan. Most crucially, Kanemaru’s willingness to promise compensation 
to the North in the Three-Party Declaration may have been explained by his ambition 
to secure these as a source of factional funds. For if Japan were to provide up to 
US$10 billion in the form of ODA and ‘economic cooperation’, then the Takeshita 
faction as the initiator of these funds could have expected a ‘kickback’ of at least one 
per cent, or ¥50 billion, from North Korea and Japanese companies awarded aid 
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contracts, and that would have allowed it to prolong its domination of Japanese 
politics.26 Indeed, it is clear that the Takeshita faction and its predecessor Tanaka 
Kakuei faction had long eyed North Korea ties as their factional property and the last 
great untapped source of political funds. Prime Minister Tanaka was the first Japanese 
premier to attempt to improve ties with North Korea in the period of détente in the 
mid-1970s; the original Dietmen’s League for the Promotion of Japan-North Korea 
Friendship (Nicchō Yūkō Sokushin Giin Renmei, or Nicchō Giren) was founded in 
1971 by Kuno Chūji, a Tanaka faction member; and it was Prime Minister Takeshita 
who first opened the way for Kanemaru’s mission with an apology in the Diet in 
March 1989 to North Korea for wartime damage. 
 
The LDP’s other factions and ‘policy tribes’ (zoku) have at various times shown an 
interest in North Korea. House of Representatives and Watanabe Michio faction 
members Tani Yōichi and Nakayama Masaaki were consistent proponents of 
improved ties with the North. Nakayama, for instance, serving from 1997 as 
Chairman of the Nicchō Giren. Watanabe himself led the LDP-SDPJ-Sakigake 
mission to North Korea in 1995; and the then number two in the faction, Yamasaki 
Taku, has been involved in individual diplomacy with the North since the mid-1990s. 
Katō Kōichi as Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), 
number two in the Miyazawa Kiichi faction, and a close political associate of 
Yamasaki in the mid-1990s, also became intimately connected with North Korea in 
this period. Katō persuaded Watanabe to visit North Korea and then negotiated the 
direct provision of rice aid to the North in 1995. The motivations for the interest of the 
Watanabe faction members and Katō are various. Tani and Nakayama represented 
Kansai region constituencies with a high proportion of North Korea residents, and, 
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although they have undoubtedly been motivated by the desire to address the colonial 
legacy and assist the humanitarian cause in the North with rice aid, the suspicion is 
that they may also have received money from groups associated with the 
Chōsensōren. Tani, Watanabe and Katō were also noted members of the agricultural 
tribe (nōrin zoku) in this period, and the suspicion is that their desire to provide rice 
aid was a measure designed to clear government stockpiles and thereby force up 
demand and the price of domestic rice for their supporters in the agricultural 
community.27 Indeed, the LDP’s nōrin zoku at other instances have shown an interest 
in engaging North Korea only when there is an opportunity for the dumping of rice 
stocks through the provision of food aid—Japan’s decision in 2000 to provide rice aid 
was critically backed by the zoku in PARC’s Foreign Affairs Division.28 
 
Nevertheless, despite the interest displayed by other LDP groups, North Korea 
diplomacy up until the late 1990s remained very much the province of the Tanaka-
Takeshita faction lineage. The Hashimoto Ryūtarō and Obuchi Keizō factions as the 
successor factions moved to reassert control over the issue in the mid-1990s, 
seemingly fearful that the likes of Katō might attempt to utilise diplomacy with the 
North not only to strengthen support amongst the agricultural zoku, but also to gain 
control of the ODA resources, and use normalisation as a springboard to move the 
Miyazawa faction into a dominant position in domestic politics. The Hashimoto-
Obuchi faction ensured that it retained its grip on North Korea policy through Katō’s 
effective exclusion from power during the Hashimoto administration; through 
Obuchi’s appointment as Foreign Minister in September 1997 and his initial early 
enthusiasm for normalisation; and through the ability of Nonaka Hiromu, a key 
faction member and later Chief Cabinet Secretary with very close ties to the North 
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Korean community in Japan and the North’s regime, to engineer the Mori mission to 
the North in November 1997 and the December 1999 Murayama mission. 
 
Hence, although competing amongst themselves for influence and control of the issue, 
the LDP’s factions throughout the 1990s envisaged considerable domestic political 
incentives in working to engage North Korea. These incentives were sufficiently 
strong to carry forward the LDP’s default engagement position even in the wake of 
the ‘Taepdong-shock’. However, a concatenation of other factors, including the 
Taepdong incident and the growing revelations relating to the abductions, meant that 
in the late 1990s the LDP began to its shift towards default containment. 
 
The LDP’s shift has in part been initiated by personnel changes. The pro-North Korea 
lobby in the LDP has been blunted by the deaths of Watanabe, Kanemaru, and Obuchi 
in 1995, 1996 and 2000 respectively, the neutralisation of Katō’s influence, the 
retirement of Nonaka from national politics in 2003, and the resignation of Fukuda 
from the post of Chief Cabinet Secretary in 2004. Just as importantly, though, it is 
clear that many of these LDP figures had already become disenchanted with North 
Korean affairs or lost influence due to the rising political risks of association with the 
North. Kanemaru received severe intra-party and media criticism due to his 
concessions during the 1990 mission and rumours of his receipt of money from the 
North, thereby contributing to his eventual political downfall in the Sagawa Kyūbin 
scandal. Similarly, Katō was vilified by sections of the media for his individual 
diplomacy in 1995; and Nonaka heavily criticised for his support for engagement 
even in the face of mounting evidence over the abductions. LDP figures have also 
faced physical threats similar to those of MOFA officials.  
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In addition, LDP politicians see not only rising political and physical risks in 
engaging North Korea, but also declining opportunities for compensatory financial 
gains. The Chōsensōren’s financial difficulties since the early 1990s have gradually 
reduced its ability to funnel money to politicians, and any flows from the North are 
under severe public scrutiny. Koizumi’s accession to the premiership and subsequent 
personal intervention in North Korea diplomacy has largely removed this issue from 
the purview of the LDP factions. Moreover, Koizumi’s systematic destruction of the 
Hashimoto faction as an internal opposition force has removed it as the one major 
grouping capable of generating momentum for engagement from within the governing 
party. 
 
By contrast, the incentives for LDP members to switch to support for containment 
have grown since the late-1990s. The LDP old-guard have been replaced by younger 
politicians, less dependent on factional financial support and with no links to the 
Chōsensōren, but more conscious of national security issues, and often from 
constituencies of the abductee families and prepared to campaign on this specific 
vote-winning issue. Most notable amongst this new breed of ‘neo-conservative’ LDP 
politicians is Abe Shinzō, the former Chairman of the LDP Countermeasures 
Headquarters for the North Korea Abduction Issue (Kitachōsen ni Yoru Rachi Mondai 
Taisaku Honbu) and the former Chairman of the Cabinet Abduction Issue Task Force 
(Rachi Mondai Tokumei Chīmu), and current Chief Cabinet Secretary, who in his bid 
to succeed Koizumi as prime minister has made significant political play out of his 
support for the families of the abductees.29 For instance, Abe in April 2006 used his 
position as Chief Cabinet Secretary to push for the conduct of DNA tests that 
established that husband of Yokota Megumi was also a probable South Korea 
 27
abductee. Abe then timed the public release of this evidence to coincide with 
unofficial SPT talks in Japan so as to generate maximum embarrassment for the North 
Korean representative visiting Tokyo.30 Abe was further responsible for initiating the 
meeting between President W. Bush and Yokota’s family in Washington D.C. in the 
same month in attempt to raise public consciousness of the abductions issue in the US 
but especially Japan.31  
 
Abe has been joined in his efforts to press the abduction issue by Hirasawa Katsuei, 
serving as Chairman of the Parliamentarian League for the Early Repatriation of 
Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea (Kitachōsen Rachi Sareta Nihonjin o 
Sōki ni Kyūshutsu Suru Tame ni Kōdō Suru Giin Renmei, or Rachi Giren)—a cross-
party group formed in October 2002 as a breakaway from the Nicchō Giren in 
opposition to Nakayama’s soft-line on the North, and also working closely with the 
Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) (Kitachōsen  
ni Yoru Rachi Higaisha Kazoku Renrakukai, or Kazokukai). The Rachi Giren 
subsequently passed a resolution that Japan should not normalise relations with North 
Korea until after a resolution of the abductions issue.32 Hirasawa, despite his anti-
North Korea credentials received harsh media criticism for his and Yamasaki’s secret 
diplomacy with the North in April 2004, forcing him to resign from the organisation. 
Hirasawa was then succeeded as chairman of the Rachi Giren by Nakagawa Shōichi 
and then Hiranuma Takeo, both former Ministers of Trade Economy and Industry 
(METI) and noted right-wingers (although Hiranuma eventually left the LDP in 
October 2005 in protest at Koizumi’s postal reforms). Other LDP figures highly 
critical of North Korea and that have offered public support for sanctions include 
former Foreign Minister Kōmura Masahiko; the current Environment Minister Koike 
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Yuriko; and the former Director General of the Japan Defence Agency Ishiba Shigeru, 
and younger politicians critical of the North include Aisawa Ichirō the current 
Chairman of the LDP Countermeasures Headquarters for the North Korea Abduction 
Issue, Yamamoto Ichita, the current head of the LDP’s sanctions simulation team, and 
Kōno Tarō.33 Koike and Yamamoto have particularly fought against the allocation of 
funds to the Chōgin. 
 
The LDP’s near complete shift to default containment is demonstrated by Abe’s free 
talk of the need to precipitate ‘regime change’ in North Korea, and his LDP 
countermeasures group laying out on 9 December 2004 a specific five-step timetable 
for sanctions on the North.34 The shift in the party is also hinted at by opinion polls of 
Diet members and candidates taken by the National Association for the Rescue of 
Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN) (Kitachōsen ni Rachi Sareta Nihonjin 
o Kyūshutsu Tame no Zenkoku Kyōgikai, or Sukūkai) taken in December 2004 and 
prior to the House of Representatives election of September 2005. Although figures 
produced by an organisation pressing for sanctions need to be handled with care, they 
do offer some reflection on the mood of the party, with both polls indicating 
respectively that eighty five and seventy two per cent of respondents were in favour of 
the early imposition of sanctions.35 
 
Coalition and Opposition Parties 
The LDP’s New Kōmeitō coalition partner since 1998 has generally maintained a pro-
normalisation stance, but it too has shifted towards talk of containment and pressing 
the North on the abductions issue, thus jointly submitting the March 2006 LDP bill 
obliging the government to impose sanctions if no progress is made on the abductions 
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issue.36 The SDPJ prior to and since Kanemaru’s visit has maintained close relations 
with the North. The SDPJ’s former Secretary General, Tanabe Makoto, was a 
signatory to the Three Party Declaration in 1990, and the SDPJ was part of the 
Watanabe and Mori missions in 1995 and 1997; former SDPJ Prime Minister 
Murayama led a mission in December 1999; and other SDPJ figures with close ties to 
the North have included the former SDPJ President Doi Takako, former SDPJ 
Secretary General Itō Shigeru, former House of Representatives member Funada 
Hajime, and the House of Councillors member Den Hideo. The SDPJ proved 
extremely influential in determining North Korea policy at the time of the first nuclear 
crisis, firmly resisting as a member of the coalition government in early 1994 any 
move to accede to US pressure for the imposition of sanctions.37 
 
Nevertheless, the SDPJ’s ability to influence domestic politics in favour of 
engagement with North Korea is now spent. The LDP since Kanemaru’s visit has 
succeeded in establishing its own links with the North’s regime, thereby rendering the 
role of the SDPJ largely redundant. In addition, the SDPJ’s influence has been eroded 
by its own internal splits and decline in electoral fortunes, leaving it with only eleven 
seats in the Diet. The SDPJ’s older generation of pro-North Korean Diet members has 
faded away, with the loss of Tanabe, Itō, Funada, and most recently in the September 
2005 election Doi, leaving only the eighty-two year old Den active in politics. In fact, 
Doi’s North Korean connections had already contributed to her electoral difficulties, 
with her defeat in the November 2003 election in a single member constituency by 
Ōmae Shigeo, an LDP newcomer, campaigning strongly on the abductions issue; 
although Doi was eventually returned under proportional representation. Meanwhile, 
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the new SDPJ membership has displayed less sympathy with North Korea, voting in 
favour of the revised FEFTL in 2004.38 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) since its formation in 1998 has displaced the 
SDPJ as the main opposition party, but it too has offered little support for engagement 
of the North. The DPJ as an initial amalgam of other political parties has exhibited a 
variety of positions on North Korea. Former DPJ leaders, Kan Naoto and Hatoyama 
Yukio as members of the Sakigake participated in the Watanabe mission of 1995; the 
DPJ has contained former LDP members such as Ishii Hajime, who as a member of 
the Tanaka faction accompanied the Kanemaru mission in 1990; and former SDPJ 
members such as Kubo Wataru with close links to the North. However, the younger 
generation of DPJ leaders and members has shifted the party more towards 
containment and sanctions. Okada Katsuya, DPJ President until September 2005, 
pressed for North Korea’s full cooperation in the abductions issue; and Hatoyama, 
now signalling his turnaround in position by becoming head of the DPJ’s own 
countermeasures team on the abductions, called in November 2004 for the 
investigation of sanctions in response to the Yokota case.39 Ozawa Ichirō, the new 
leader of the DPJ since April 2006, has had dealings with North Korea in the past 
from his time as a member of the Takeshita faction, and following on from the 
Kanemaru mission visited the North in October 1990 to bring home the crew of the 
Fujisanmaru 18. However, since his departure from the LDP in 1993, Ozawa has 
shown little interest in engagement with North Korea. 
 
The DPJ has also attempted to rival the LDP by stating a desire in its November 2003 
and September 2005 election manifestos to resolve the abductions issue through the 
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potential use of sanctions; the DPJ cooperated with the LDP on the Law to Prevent 
Designated Ships From Visiting Japanese Ports in June 2004; and in February 2005 
the DPJ submitted a bill similar to that of the LDP to assist North Korean defectors.40 
The DPJ also formerly contained the right-wing figure of Nishimura Shingō, known 
for his vehemently anti-North Korean stance; although he has been expelled from the 
party since November 2006 due to unconnected corruption charges. Meanwhile, the 
NARKN surveys of 2004 and 2005 showed over sixty per cent of DPJ respondents in 
favour of sanctions.41 
 
Local Government 
Japan’s local government authorities have further shifted the balance of domestic 
coalitions towards containment. Ishihara Shintarō has utilised his position as Tokyo 
Governor to berate the Japanese government for its soft stance on North Korea’s 
security provocations and the abductions, and pursued the Chōsensōren by leading the 
campaign to remove its tax-exempt status. The NARKN has also pushed hard on this 
issue, winning a court decision in February 2006 forcing Kumamoto City to rescind 
the tax status of local Chōsensōren facilities. Local authorities have pressured against 
engagement in a number of other ways. The prefectural assemblies of Fukuoka, 
Kumamoto and Kanagawa submitted letters to Koizumi in 2002 urging the 
government to be ‘firm’ in negotiations with the North on the abductions and 
normalisation; the Mayor of Niigata petitioned the government in June 2003 to halt 
the port calls of the Mangyongbong-92; and the Niigata prefectural assembly the 
following month provided the governor with the right to refuse entry to poorly 
equipped ships. Niigata Prefecture’s action again represents a turnaround in attitude, 
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with many of the prefectures along the Sea of Japan coast having been keen in the 
early 1990s to improve political and economic ties with the North. 
 
Chōsensōren 
The role of the Chōsensōren and the North Korean community in Japan in 
encouraging other domestic actors to engage the North has waned significantly since 
the mid-1990s. The Chōsensōren has been increasingly bypassed as a channel for 
bilateral ties since the establishment of the LDP’s and Japanese government’s own 
direct links with the North since the early 1990s. Added to this, the Chōsensōren’s 
ability to provide financial incentives has declined. The post-bubble recession hit the 
receipts of the pachinko industry, produced the collapse and increased regulation of 
the Chōgin, and the decline in remittances to the North. For instance, Japan’s Ministry 
of Finance estimated that the total flow of remittances through official channels, 
already in decline since the 1990s, had fallen to ¥4 billion in 2002 (¥400 million in 
bank transfers; ¥3.6 billion in cash delivered by visitors to North Korea), and then 
further fell to ¥2.7 billion in 2003 (¥101 million bank transfers, and ¥2.57 billion in 
cash deliveries).42 
 
Business interests 
Japanese business interests, and especially large corporations, have long occupied a 
potentially key role in creating momentum for engagement with North Korea, as in 
the case of the role of private business sector actors in pushing for normalisation with 
China in the 1970s. However, in practice large businesses have tended to abdicate 
their policy role in dealing with North Korea since the early 1990s. 
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Japanese businesses have certainly had a major interest in North Korea from the 
1970s onwards. During the period of détente, a number of large Japanese companies 
looked to set up operations in the North in order to export its mineral resources, 
leading to a major expansion of bilateral trade. But Japan-North Korea economic ties 
subsequently deteriorated due to North Korea’s inability to repay up to US$900 
million in accumulated debts to Japanese companies; an issue that remains largely 
unresolved to this day. Japanese construction companies again showed an interest in 
North Korea at the time of the Kanemaru mission, as explained above, and some 
interest in the North’s Rajin-Sonbong Free Economy and Trade Zone initiated in 
1991. Japanese large businesses have remained interested in the North’s resources, 
and a group of ten construction companies planned to send a mission to the North in 
October 2004 to investigate possible ODA construction projects that might be realised 
after normalisation.43 However, Japanese large businesses are yet to act on these plans 
due to the continuing debt issue, the lack of central government support through 
providing export credits, and the political uncertainties of doing business with the 
North—the group of construction companies eventually shelving their trip to North 
Korea for fear of a public backlash in the wake of the Yokota case.44 
 
Instead, Japan-North economic ties have been left principally to small business 
activities. Chōsensōren-affilitated companies and Japanese medium and small 
enterprises companies have done vigorous trade in cheap business suits, textiles, and 
in matsutake and marine products. These business interests offer some resistance to 
sanctions, expressing concerns that measures to complicate trade with the North such 
as boycotting asari will affect their business, and also that the revised insurance laws 
on shipping will have a knock-on impact on trade with Russian shipping.45 But the 
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small-scale nature of these businesses, and lack of allies amongst larger scale 
corporations, means that they have little practical influence over the growing 
disposition of domestic coalitions towards containment. In the meantime, Japan-North 
Korea trade continues to contract overall, falling to a twenty-eight year low in 2005 of 
US$190 million (compared to around 500 million dollars for most of the 1980s and 
1990s), and accounted for Japanese consumers’ boycotts of North Korea goods and 
the enhanced regulations on North Korean exports and shipping.46 
 
Conclusion: Japanese Domestic Politics as a Driver of North Korea Policy 
The detailed examination above of Japanese sanctions policy demonstrates that, if the 
attitudes of key and pluralistic domestic policymakers are aggregated, it is possible to 
discern a number of important trends in Japan’s overall approach towards North 
Korea. Firstly, domestic policymakers have come to form a series of cross-cutting 
coalitions that have shifted Japanese attitudes from a position of default engagement 
to one of increasingly default containment. Japan’s domestic policymakers, although 
generally in favour of engagement of the North at the time of the first North Korean 
nuclear crisis, began to shift towards containment after the mid-1990s and in the 
aftermath of the ‘Taepdong-shock’. This shift has intensified following, and in many 
ways in spite of, Koizumi’s diplomacy with the North from 2001-2006. In addition, 
although Japanese domestic political actors have at times pursued this trend in fitful 
bursts and even reversed their position, the overall trend has been towards hardening 
on engagement, with progressively fewer signs of a willingness to backslide on 
sanctions. Hence, MOFA’s engagers have been marginalised by those taking a hard-
line on the North; the Kantei has played a decisive but often only sporadic role in 
engagement, and is increasingly being used to forge policies of containment under 
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Abe’s influence; the LDP has shifted from being a party of engagement to one of 
containment; the SDPJ has evaporated as a force for engagement and been replaced 
by the DPJ increasingly seeking to rival the LDP on its hard-line stance; local 
government has reinforced the containment trend; the North Korean community in 
Japan has declining resources to generate support for engagement; and the business 
community is currently disinterested in engagement. 
 
Secondly, Japan’s domestic policy-actors in pursuing these coalition-forming trends 
have generally been consistent in acting against or with disregard for international 
pressures. At the time of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, Japan’s policymakers, 
by holding out for limited engagement, came close to setting themselves at opposition 
to international systemic pressures. Following the first nuclear crisis to the period of 
Koizumi’s diplomacy, Japan’s domestic coalitions have reversed their position and set 
themselves more towards containment, even as the international system, with 
fluctuations, has increasingly looked towards creating opportunities for engagement. 
 
Thirdly, and most crucially, it must be observed that the move of Japanese domestic 
coalitions towards containment, whilst kicking against the trends in international 
systemic pressures, has not just coincided with, but clearly triggered actual policy 
changes within Japan with regard to containment. These are such that Japan, more 
than at any other time in the previous decade, now actively possesses the capability 
and the policy will to impose sanctions on the North. The conclusion is that Japan’s 
domestic political coalitions are affecting and driving real policy change towards 
containment, and that it is progressively challenging, if not beginning to override 
international pressures in determining the overall policy orientation. 
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Japan’s policy behaviour on shifts towards containment and sanctions, therefore, 
affirms the theory of domestic sanctions put forward in this article. Japan’s domestic 
policymakers are on the brink of forming a ‘threshold coalition’ that is generating 
increasing pressure to tip government policy towards the imposition of sanctions. In 
many cases, Japan’s domestic policymakers have been motivated to pursue both 
instrumental sanctions that are aimed at undermining the North Korean regime, and 
‘expressive’ sanctions that despite talk of ‘regime change’ may not inflict critical 
damage on the North but do demonstrate general abhorrence towards the regime over 
the abductions and other security issues. The case study presented above also 
conforms with theory by demonstrating that crucial factors in the formation of the 
domestic coalition have been not only the growing disinclination of large policy 
actors to engage North Korea, but also the ability of smaller actors, such as the 
NARKN and AFVKN, to manipulate the pressure of public opinion in order to 
solidify the coalition.47 Domestic sanctions theory is further affirmed by the fact that 
big business interests, as a possible source of momentum for turning back to 
engagement, have largely abdicated their role in the policy process, thereby opening 
up space for usually less influential actors to shape the containment agenda. Finally, 
domestic sanctions theory is reinforced because the nature of Japanese domestic 
coalitions indicates that they are now increasingly capable of capturing the initiative 
in pushing government policy towards containment, even to the point of contravening 
international pressures. 
 
In terms of overall conclusions, this article argues that Japanese policy behaviour over 
the past decade can only be adequately explained by a focus on its domestic 
 37
determinants, and, concomitantly, that international pressures are both insufficient and 
declining in their explanatory quality. This study of Japan’s North Korea policy, 
viewed as increasingly driven by domestic politics, thus complements other studies 
that have looked to domestic sources to explain Japanese foreign and security policy 
behaviour. However, it also makes a further contribution to this body of literature by 
indicating theoretically and empirically the particular dynamic process and conditions, 
in the shape of the formation of ‘threshold’ coalitions, by which domestic politics 
becomes increasingly decisive in shaping policy outcomes. 
 
In turn, the focus on domestic policy actors as key in determining Japan’s North 
Korea policy offers important conclusions about the level of Japan’s cooperation in 
dealing with the current nuclear crisis and its significance in Korean Peninsula 
security affairs. Japanese domestic coalitions’ increasing disposition towards the 
containment of the North means that Japan is not likely to bend easily, or at all, to 
conform to US and South Korean efforts to engage the North, even if the SPT and 
other attempts to resolve the nuclear crisis progress. Japan’s government, restrained 
by domestic political pressures, may prove obdurate in providing crucial financial 
resources to support US-led attempts to persuade the North to dismantle its nuclear 
programme. Japan’s non-cooperation may thus serve to magnify its importance in 
Korean Peninsula affairs, even if this is ascribed to Japan’s undermining international 
efforts to deal with the North. 
 
Japan’s government might yet break out of the restraints of domestic political 
pressures. Although Koizumi’s summitry heightened the importance of the abductions 
issue in Japan, it also succeeded in making important headway in a resolution to the 
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issue and in establishing an agreed negotiating agenda for normalisation. Furthermore, 
the full weight of international pressures has not yet been brought to bear on Japan—
the US possibly pushing Japan much harder to conform with engagement policy if it 
sees Japan as an obstacle to an imminent resolution to the nuclear issue. Japan might 
also yet be spared a clash with its ally, if the US itself, increasingly frustrated at the 
lack of progress in the SPT shifts decisively towards containment and sanctions; 
although the US’s basic policy remains one of seeking a negotiated resolution through 
balanced policies of engagement and pressure. Nevertheless, the fundamental lesson 
from the last decade of Japan-North Korea relations will still remain: Japan’s 
domestic political pressures have set much of the pace for government policy, and, 
without any significant weakening of domestic coalitions pushing for containment, 
then these domestic pressures are likely to continue to trip up, or even fully block, 
international efforts for engagement. 
 
Postscript 
At the time of the final preparation of this article in August 2006, Japan has imposed 
new sanctions on North Korea in response to its missile tests the preceding July. 
Japan’s government on 5 July immediately implemented unilateral sanctions to ban 
the entry into Japan of the Manyongbong-92, of North Korean charter flights, and 
North Korean officials. Japan has further investigated the implementation of the full 
range of sanctions outlined in the Table in this article, and later in the month tightened 
restrictions on trade in possible components for the North’s missile programmes.  
 
Japan’s measures have further served to confirm the arguments of this article. Firstly, 
the North’s missile tests have brought the pro-sanctions threshold coalition fully to the 
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surface. Koizumi has played some role in restraining the adoption of the full panoply 
of sanctions, but he has ceded leadership on the North Korean issue to his 
presumptive successor Abe, with a resultant hardening of domestic pressures to 
contain the North. Secondly, Japan’s sanctions have been imposed often in opposition 
to prevailing international pressures. Japan has worked with the US to construct UN 
resolution 1659, condemning North Korea’s tests and requiring member states to 
prevent the transfer to the North of missile technology and components. Nevertheless, 
despite US-Japan cooperation at the UN level, the Bush administration overall has 
been averse to stronger sanctions on the North. The US remains wary of provoking 
Chinese opposition and jeopardising any prospects for the restart of the SPT in order 
to address its main priority of resolving the nuclear issue. Japan’s focus on the missile 
issue and its drive for sanctions, largely inspired by domestic pressures and largely 
out of kilter with Chinese, Russian, South Korean and even US strategic priorities, 
thus threatens to render it further isolated and obstructive in Korean Peninsula 
security affairs. 
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